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Financial implications of capital outflows  
in Chile: 1998–2008
1 
Jorge Desormeaux, Karol Fernández and Pablo García 
I. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the Chilean economy has continued with a gradual process of 
increasing financial integration with the world, reflected in increased stocks of both foreign 
assets and foreign liabilities held by domestic residents. This, along with a significant 
reduction in net foreign liabilities, is probably the main structural external financial 
development of the past decade (Graph 1).  
Graph 1 
Net international investment position, by institutional sector 
As a percentage of GDP
1 
 
1    GDP at a constant real exchange rate (base index December 2005 = 100). 
2  Estimated from capital account flows. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
This process has been driven by several factors. Regulatory, normative and legal/tax 
changes have reduced the wedges that used to constrain the financial relationships between 
residents and non-residents. The adoption of an inflation targeting framework with flexible 
exchange rates and a solid commitment to fiscal prudence has helped import the great 
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moderation in inflation and interest rates we have observed in the global economy in the last 
20 years. A system of prudential regulation has been a key factor for the development of a 
sound and stable banking and financial system. 
This paper focuses on certain specific issues associated with this process, namely the 
financial implications arising from increasing holdings of foreign assets by pension funds and 
the evolving correlation of local and external financial asset prices. Section II of the paper 
presents the main policy changes implemented in the past 10 years and briefly discusses the 
issue of capital controls. Section III addresses the role of pension funds in the development 
of the market for hedging instruments, while Section IV shows the evolving links between 
local and external interest rates and equity prices. Section V concludes with an exploration of 
some of the challenges that lie ahead with regard to achieving deeper financial integration 
with the rest of the world.  
II. Structural  policy  measures since 1999 
The outcome of the turbulent period between 1997 and 1998 led to a substantial revision of 
the policy framework in practically all the relevant dimensions. One of the most important 
lessons derived from the management of the consequences of the Asian and Russian crises 
was that there was a need for a significant upgrade in the coordination of macroeconomic 
policies and a clarification of the relative importance of the different objectives that had been 
pursued in the previous period.  
A list of the measures undertaken since then contains the following: 
Suspension of the exchange rate band and adoption of inflation targeting 
In September 1999, the exchange rate band was finally suspended in favour of a free float 
after a brief period in which it was quickly widened. The central bank, however, announced that 
it still held the right to intervene in forex markets, but would do so only under exceptional 
circumstances, making a public statement regarding the characteristics of the intervention. 
Later, in 2005, it actually stated that the norm in these circumstances (which coincided with the 
actual episodes in 2001 and 2002) would be sterilised intervention. This can be understood as 
the intention by the central bank to sharply distinguish between the use of an extraordinary 
instrument, intervention, and monetary policy, in such a way as to further shield the inflation 
targeting regime from the suspicion that it could have an implicit exchange rate target.  
Increased financial integration 
During the first half of this decade the central bank and the government implemented a 
number of measures that can be interpreted as aiming to strengthen the credibility of the 
floating exchange rate regime. These consisted in the reduction to 0% of the unremunerated 
reserve requirement and its subsequent elimination, along with the free trade agreement with 
the United States (with some restrictive provisions). Additionally, the central bank revamped 
its whole regulatory framework for foreign exchange rate transactions, in essence eliminating 
all regulatory burdens except for the information required for balance of payments statistics. 
The minimum holding period for profits from foreign investment was also lifted, while non-
residents were exempted from capital gains taxes in the local stock market as long as they 
invested in liquid shares.  
These measures were also complemented by a gradual but significant increase in the foreign 
exposure allowed for pension funds. Pension funds in Chile currently hold more than 
USD 100 billion in assets (around two thirds of GDP), and have a cap on investments abroad 
of 40%. This is up from a legal limit of 10% in the mid-1990s, which nevertheless was not BIS Papers No 44  123
 
 
binding, given the more profitable investment opportunities offered by the domestic market, 
which was one of the overall implications of the policy framework in place at that time. The 
current cap in the law is set to be extended to 45% by April 2007, while the authorities have 
pledged to further increase this figure to 60% by September 2007 and 80% by September 2008.
2 
Fiscal policy reforms and statistical consolidation 
The institutional backing for a floating exchange rate regime, with fully fledged inflation 
targeting and a widely open capital account, resides in prudent fiscal policy management. 
Since 2000, fiscal policy has been anchored by a commitment to set annual budgetary 
expenses in line with long-term fiscal revenues, targeting a small structural surplus. Thus, 
current fiscal revenues are cyclically adjusted and copper-related earnings are adjusted for 
deviations from long-term copper prices. As a result, the government was able to run 
moderate deficits in the early part of this decade (from 2000 to 2003), which then turned into 
significant surpluses from 2004 onwards, thanks to a large increase in copper prices. The 
commitment to a fiscal rule was further enhanced in 2005 after a Fiscal Responsibility Law 
was enacted, detailing the requirements for the annual calculation of the structural surplus 
implicit in the budget, and also creating specific sovereign wealth funds to save the 
significant resources accumulated in recent years. It moreover earmarked part of the surplus 
(in case the fiscal situation allows for it) for the capitalisation of the central bank, by up to 
0.5% of GDP per year and up to a cumulative total of 2.5% of GDP by 2010. 
Capital controls since 1990 
The discussion about capital controls – being understood as specific restrictions on capital 
inflows or outflows – is part of a long theoretical and empirical debate about the optimal level 
of openness of the capital account. On one hand, capital account openness should promote 
economic growth, help to smooth consumption, foment technological spillovers, and even 
discipline domestic economic players.
3 On the other, it may increase output and consumption 
volatility because of major exposure to an international financial crisis, or because of a loss 
of independence of monetary policy.
4 The optimal level of capital account openness, ie the 
optimal degree of capital controls, will depend on the estimated magnitude of these potential 
gains and costs.  
This complex debate is influenced by how gains and costs of capital controls are affected by: 
(i) the type of restriction under consideration (quantitative restrictions, taxes, restrictions on 
inflows or outflows) and the expected horizon of application; (ii) the interactions between 
capital flows and the rest of the country’s macroeconomic policies, regulatory policies 
(especially those related to the financial system) and degree of institutional development; 
(iii) the degree of commitment, credibility and severity of the implementation process by the 
authorities.
5  
                                                  
2   It should be noted that the law that governs pension fund investments determines maximum and minimum limits 
for foreign exposure, giving the central bank the mandate to determine the specific limit within these ranges. In 
the past few years the central bank has always chosen a limit equal to the maximum stated in the law. 
3    For a detailed account of the effects of capital account openness on economic growth see Eichengreen 
(2001), Edison et al (2002) and Klein (2005). A complete discussion about the effects of capital account 
openness on financial integration and consumption smoothing is presented in Sheffrin and Woo (1990), 
Montiel and Reinhart (1999) and Cashin and McDermott (2002).  
4   See Krugman (1998), Rodrick (1998), Stiglitz (2000). For a recent and opposite view see Edwards (2005) and 
Glick et al (2006). 
5   Another complication arises from the empirical difficulty of incorporating the endogeneity of decisions about 




Evolution of capital controls in the world in the 1990s 
 Characteristics  Declared policy 









To limit the instability 
that short-term capital 
flows may cause.  
To change capital 
flows’ composition to 
achieve more stable 
flows, avoiding 
volatile flows that 
exacerbate the 
vulnerability of the 
domestic financial 
system. 
To preserve monetary 






Some initial effects were accomplished, but 
no country fulfilled all objectives.  
Almost all the countries were able to 
maintain a spread between local and foreign 
interest rates. 
An appreciation of the local currency was 
observed in all countries, with different 
impacts on their current accounts. 
Only Malaysia and Thailand were able to 
reduce the magnitude of capital inflows. 
All countries had to resort to sterilisation. 
Some evidence indicates that Chile and 
Colombia were able to reduce short-term 
capital inflows, and to introduce a wedge 
between local and international financial 
markets.  


















China (since 1990) 
India (since 1990) 
These restrictions seem to have limited the 
exposure of these economies to the Asian 
crisis, and helped to change the composition 
of capital inflows in favour of long-term flows.
Other factors that explain these results may 
be: strong foreign financial position, large 
size of domestic markets, fewer commercial 
and financial links with the rest of the world, 
weak financial development (low financial 
intermediation of banks); floating exchange 















To encourage a more 






Ideally, capital controls must be employed as 
a transitory measure while reforms are being 
implemented (Malaysia), and not as a 
substitute for reforms. If the incentive to 
evade capital controls is high (high yield 
spread) or if controls are less restrictive 
(Thailand), the capital controls may be less 








To impose massive 
currency restrictions 





Controls provided transitory alleviation of 
pressures on the current account, but did not 
protect against the fundamental causes of 
the imbalances. 
Controls seem to have reduced access to 
international financial markets, and this 
eventually forced the removal of restrictions 
and persuaded authorities to focus on solutions 
to the macroeconomic and financial 





  To rapidly suppress 
capital controls, as a 
sign of commitment 
with the 
implementation of 
structural reforms and 
to correct domestic 
imbalances. To 
stimulate favourable 





Foreign investment increased in Argentina 
and Peru, while in Kenya the effect was 
practically nil. 
Timely complementary reforms in Argentina 
and Peru helped to prevent a recession.  
When adequate macroeconomic and 
financial policies are not implemented, rapid 
liberalisation of the capital account may 
increase domestic vulnerabilities to 
international shocks (Kenya).  
1  Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997).    
2  Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997). 
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International experiences of capital controls since 1990 
During the 1990s, a set of countries employed capital controls in spite of the global tendency 
towards greater capital account openness.
6 Table 1 describes those episodes, distinguishing 
between ex ante and ex post restrictions. The experience of three countries where a rapid 
opening-up of the capital account was implemented as a response to an internal crisis is also 
included in Table 1. 
Capital controls in Chile in the 1990s 
The unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) imposed by the Central Bank of Chile on 
selective (mostly short-term or financial) capital inflows during 1991–98 represented a tax on 
inflows. The objectives of the URR were: (i) to avoid currency appreciation; (ii) to enhance 
the independence of monetary policy; and (iii) to reduce the vulnerability that an increase in 
external indebtedness – particularly in the short term – might cause.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the effects of the URR on the interest rate differential, the 
appreciating trend, and total capital inflows were limited.
7 Additionally, there is no consensus 
about the role that capital controls played in insulating the economy from external shocks, 
such as the Asian crisis. Baghwati (1998) argues that capital controls may help prevent 
contagion, while Cowan and De Gregorio (2006) hold that it is difficult to argue that the URR 
was an important element behind the relative resiliency of the Chilean economy in the late 
1990s. Moreover, Edwards (1998) points out that Chile also had capital controls during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s and the country could not avoid a deep crisis. 
Finally, a large number of studies have emphasised the microeconomic costs of the URR on 
the Chilean economy. Edwards (1998) argues that the URR affected the domestic financial 
services industry, and discriminated against small and medium-sized firms, which were not 
able to access long-term financing to reduce the burden of the tax.
8 Cowan and De Gregorio 
(2006) maintain that the URR may have had some influence on the low intermediation of 
foreign capital observed by domestic banks. 
III.  Pension funds’ financial outflows and their financial implications 
Graphs 2 and 3 present capital account flows to emerging market economies and to Chile in 
particular.
9 A cursory glance at the main shapes of these flows shows a high degree of 
coincidence. The pre-Asian crisis situation was characterised by a striking absence of 
outflows, and hence the current account, the net inflows and gross inflows all coincided. This 
has changed dramatically in the present decade. Outflows are of the same order of 
magnitude as inflows, and therefore a sharp fall in the availability of financing to the current 
account cannot necessarily be attributed to capital flow reversals. Moreover, Chile has not 
shown a qualitatively different pattern of net inflows, or larger outflows and inflows, when 
compared to other emerging economies.  
                                                  
6   See Edwards (2005) and Miniane (2004). 
7    See Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1996), Larraín et al (1997), Edwards (1999), Gallego et al (1999) and 
De Gregorio et al (2000). 
8   Forbes (2007) measures this point. 




Capital account flows to emerging market economies
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1  By convention, inflows are registered with a positive sign and outflows with a negative 
sign. A positive (negative) inflow indicates an increase (decrease) of inflows, while a 
positive (negative) outflow indicates a decrease (increase) of outflows. Countries 
included in the sample are Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Ahumada et al (2006b). 
Graph 3 
Capital account flows to Chile 
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In the case of Chile this point was forcefully made by Cowan et al (2007), by showing that the 
usual interpretation of a sudden stop in capital inflows was an inadequate rendering of the 
Chilean balance of payments evolution in 1997 and 1998. Indeed, the reduction in net inflows 
from 1997 to 1999 was driven by a sudden start (their expression) in outflows, mostly in debt 
but also on equity instruments. This stands in sharp contrast with the overall experience of 
emerging economies which did suffer a dramatic reversal in capital account debt inflows over 
this period.  
What were the drivers of this sharp increase in outflows in Chile in 1998 and 1999? It is 
readily apparent from official data (including both the balance of payments and the 
international investment position) that local banks as well as pension funds played a large 
role in shifting the capital account situation. 
Graph 4 presents the foreign exposure of pension funds since the mid-1990s. As noted 
previously, early on pension funds did not hold many foreign assets, given that the policy mix 
of an exchange rate band and high local interest rates made local investment opportunities 
more attractive. However, starting with the turmoil that the Asian crisis provoked in 1997 and 
1998, and following the relaxation of controls on capital flows and the floating of the peso 
from 1998 to 2001, pension funds rapidly reached their regulatory limit. This amounted to a 
substantial capital outflow, reaching a cumulative total of USD 3,325.3 million in the period 
from 1997 to 2000. 
Graph 4 
Net foreign currency exposure of pension funds, 1996–2007
1 
As a percentage of total assets 
 
1  As of August 2007.    
2  Each fund’s limit is weighted by size. 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Superintendencia de 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones. 
The second source of capital outflows was the banking system. Graph 5 shows foreign 
currency assets and liabilities of the banking sector. Some patterns can also be related to the 
changing macroeconomic policy framework of these years. A reduction in both foreign assets 
and liabilities under the exchange rate band regime was followed by a rapid increase in the 
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and the regime shift. The cumulative net change in the foreign exchange position held by the 
financial sector reached around USD 1,700 million between 1997 and 2000. 
Graph 5 
Bank assets and liabilities in foreign currency, 1989–2007
1 
As a percentage of total assets 
 
1  As of October 2007. 
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.  
Therefore, a case could be made that the policy regime changes led to some stress-inducing 
capital outflows from the last part of the 1990s to the early part of this decade. However, a 
full appraisal has to take into account more recent developments and the structural 
implications of the new circumstances. 
Prominent among these is the sustained increase in the holdings of external assets by 
pension funds. From 2001 to 2007, the share of the portfolio that could be allocated abroad 
rose from a little over 15% to 40%. The central bank moved in tandem with these shifts and 
pension funds also quickly kept pace with the new regulatory limits.  
A significant change occurred in 2002, when foreign asset exposure was legally separated 
from foreign currency exposure, while also introducing a multi-fund structure to pension 
funds’ portfolios that allows contributors to the system to decide the overall risk profile of their 
pension allocation. In macroeconomic terms, the first modification has had significant 
implications. As Graph 4 shows, although pension funds have diversified their exposure to 
foreign assets up to the legal limit, they have not fully hedged their currency exposure. The 
latter has increased but has remained well below the legal limit.
10 A rough calculation shows 
that on average the unhedged foreign currency exposure of pension funds is only 20% of the 
maximum allowed by law. 
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What are the financial implications of this situation? On the one hand, pension funds are 
hedging a substantial part of their exposure to foreign exchange rate risk, although in the 
future the degree to which they undertake this will be determined by the actual portfolio 
decisions of pension contributors. How much exchange rate fluctuations affect the perceived 
wealth of contributors and therefore their current financial and real decisions is open to 
question. Pension funds are in this sense the proper vehicle to bear market risk, and are not 
subject to liquidity risk. On the other hand, one important structural implication of pension 
funds hedging their exchange rate risk, ie selling long forward positions in foreign exchange 
to the local banking system, is that local banks, by aiming to keep their foreign exchange 
exposure close to zero, intermediate this position by also selling long forward positions in 
foreign exchange to their clients. Thus, the clients of the banking system (most notably 
corporations faced with future foreign exchange commitments, for instance related to 
external debt) find a ready counterpart to buy long forward positions in foreign exchange in 
the banking system and thus hedge their balance sheet exposure to exchange rate risk. 
Regulations in place imply that pension funds have to hedge their foreign exchange 
exposure locally. Thus, there is a significant stock supply of foreign currency which is sold 
forward and intermediated in the over-the-counter (OTC) market by banks.
11 Concurrently, 
market and liquidity risk regulations put in place by the central bank in 2004 and 2005 have 
further increased the role of banks in the intermediation of this hedging supply, as the capital 
requirements for bank holdings of unhedged foreign currency positions have remained high. 
This explains why the net foreign currency exposure of banks is very low, as shown in 
Graph 5. 
Graph 6 shows the counterparties for banks’ foreign currency derivatives transactions, as of 
June 2007. As can be readily seen, pension funds are a large participant in the long forward 
forex positions of banks. The counterpart to this situation is a substantial short forward forex 
position held by banks with firms and non-residents. Thus, pension funds are indirectly 
providing forex hedging opportunities to Chilean firms.  
Table 2 shows a view of the demand for hedging from manufacturing firms. Clearly only large 
and very large firms are important players in this market, although this might be related to the 
fact that small firms are not prominent in the export sector. 
From the financial sector side, it is also the case that the hedging supply from pension funds 
is intermediated through specific banks. Table 3 displays the foreign exchange section of the 
balance sheet of specific groups of banks.
12 Over time, it shows that the notional size of 
derivatives only increased after 1999, coinciding with the policy measures mentioned earlier. 
Moreover, the net mismatch is low in all groupings, and has remained so over time, reflecting 
the fact that the pattern in Graph 5 is relevant to different groups of banks. However, the 
most striking feature of recent developments is the disproportionate participation of “treasury 
banks”, essentially branches of large international investment banks. Although they only 
represent 3.6% of total assets and 9.6% of total capital of the banking sector, as of 
September 2007 they provided 37.3% of the total notional forward short position in forex 
currency.  
                                                  
11   Due to a number of issues, exchange-traded derivatives are very scarce, if not inexistent.  




Counterparties in banks’ foreign currency  
derivatives operations
1 
As a percentage of notional value 
 
1  As of June 2007. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
The significant size of pension funds has also implied that large shifts in their demand for 
foreign exchange hedging have had a significant impact on inshore dollar markets. Due 
probably to tax wedges and the small size of the market, pension fund portfolio shifts have 
led to significant changes in the premia in the forward market. However, from an overall 
macroeconomic perspective, the implications of pension funds’ portfolio shifts for the main 
financial prices, such as the exchange rate, stock prices, or long-term interest rates, have 
been muted, small and transitory at best. As the next section shows, these have broadly 


















































          
Firms   [number]    1,713    1,113    688    330    3,844 
  [% of the group]    72.3%    83.7%   87.4%   90.4%   79.3% 
Amount of debt   [% of the total]    2.6%   5.8%    19.4%   72.2%    100.0% 
  [% of group sales]   17.4%    15.4%    17.6%    8.7%    10.1% 
Domestic debt in 
foreign currency 
          
Firms [number]    110    326    421    265    1,122 
  [% of the group]    4.6%    24.5%   53.5%   72.6%   23.1% 
Amount of debt  [% of the total]    0.4%   1.6%    14.0%   84.0%    100.0% 
  [% of group sales]  1.2%  2.0%   5.9%   4.7%   4.7% 
External debt             
Firms [number]    8    16    41    76    141 
  [% of the group]    0.3%    1.2%   5.2%   20.8%   2.9% 
Amount of debt  [% of the total]    0.1%   0.3%    1.7%   98.0%    100.0% 
  [% of group sales]  0.3%  0.4%   0.8%   6.6%   5.6% 
Currency derivatives 
market (long and 
short positions) 
          
Firms [number]    2    15    81    65    163 
  [% of the group]    0.1%    1.1%   10.3%   17.8%   3.4% 
Notional amount
5  [% of the total]    0.6%    0.3%   11.6%   87.5%   100.0% 
  [% of group sales]   0.5%    0.1%    1.4%    1.4%    1.3% 
1  Of the firms in the ENIA manufacturing survey, 67 have FECUs (standardised financial statements), and 
55 of these are “mega firms”.    
2  [% of total] refers to the percentage that the size group represents in the total. 
[% of group] is the fraction of firms in the size group presenting values different from zero for the variable in 
question. [% of group sales] is the percentage that the variable in question represents in the total sales of the 
group.    
3  Small firms include 134 “micro firms” (sales < USD 92,000).    
4  The simple average of bank debt 
over sales for the FECU firms in the sample is 18%. The same average, using bank liabilities and operating 
income of the FECU firms, is 20%. For this same group of firms, the simple average of the ratio of the notional 
amount of derivatives (short and long positions) and the sales reported in  the ENIA is 3.6%. The same ratio 
using operating income from the FECUs is 3.6%, and it falls to 1.8% if total assets from the FECUs are used 
instead of operating income.    
5  The value of the notional amount over total sales for small firms is determined 
by a firm that has a ratio of the notional amount to sales of 600%. 




Foreign currency mismatches, by type of bank, 1989–2007
1 
As a percentage of total assets 

































Assets    19   17   19   14    4   11    17   13   15   33   29    25 

















































































Long position    3   13   10    2   11    6    8   23    9   24    213  159 
Short  position    4   16   9   2    15   6    9   29   10   25   226  163 
Net  mismatch    1   2   –3   2    1   –2    1   4   1   6   15    4 
1  As  of  October  2007.    
2    Private multibanks include: Banco de Chile, Santander Santiago and BCI. 
3  Medium-sized banks include: BBVA, Corpbanca, Banco BICE, Itaú, Citibank, Banco Internacional, Security, 
Rabobank, Scotiabank, Banco del Desarrollo, Falabella, Ripley and Paris.       
4    Treasury banks include: 
JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, ABN Amro, Deutsche Bank, Tokyo, Banco Nación Argentina, Banco do Brasil, 
Monex and Penta. 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Figueroa and Jara (2006). 
 
IV.   Asset prices over the period of higher financial integration 
Following Cifuentes and Desormeaux (2003), we look at various measures of financial 
integration in the Chilean economy, in order to asses its extent and evolution since the early 
1990s. We analyse the case of the stock and fixed income markets, correlating the returns of 
domestic and US instruments. In order to capture the evolution of financial integration over 
time, two-year moving windows were used for the estimations. 
Stock exchange 
Graph 7 shows the domestic stock market index (IPSA) compared with the Dow Jones index 




Stock market indexes 
In local currency 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Since the data series are stationary, we can estimate the following equation on returns: 
)) 1 ( log( ) log( ) log( − β + α + = IPSA d DowJones d c IPSA d  
where the log differences correspond to the returns of the series. Coefficient α measures the 
degree of correlation between the IPSA and Dow Jones returns in US dollars, and coefficient 
β captures the importance of returns in the previous period in explaining today’s return. 
Graph 8 
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Graph 8 shows the values of the coefficient α in the left-hand axis and its significance on the 
right-hand axis. A band between the values –2 and 2 shows the area where the estimated 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Correlation between the domestic and 
foreign stock markets became significant by mid-1994 and has remained so throughout the 
sample. Given our two-year windows, this suggests that financial integration at the level of 
stock markets became a significant phenomenon by mid-1992. The estimated values of α 
fluctuate between 0.2 and 0.8, reaching peaks in 2000 and 2007. These correspond to 
episodes of strong co-movements across markets that are captured by the moving window. 
The first episode corresponds to the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000 and the 
second to the recent turbulence in financial markets derived from the subprime crisis. 
Stock market volatility, measured in Graph 9 by the standard deviation of a two-year window 
of daily returns, shows a decreasing trend, particularly after the bursting of the dotcom 
bubble in 2000, with a small reversal at the end of the sample period, when the turbulence 
derived from the subprime crisis ensued. In theory, integration should lead to lower volatility, 
as a larger investor base and more liquid markets should help to diffuse the effect of local 
shocks. But at the same time, external shocks will be transmitted more easily to the domestic 
market, which is also clear in Graph 9 for the 1995–97 and 1998–2000 periods. 
Graph 9 
Daily IPSA returns: average and standard deviation 
In per cent 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Bloomberg. 
Interest rates 
For fixed income instruments we explore evidence about financial integration on the money 
market and the market for long-term bonds (see Graphs 10 and 11). As in Cifuentes and 
Desormeaux (2003), we use the money market as our test of monetary independence, as it 






















Short-term domestic and foreign interest rates 
In per cent 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Chile; Bloomberg. 
Graph 11  
Correlation between domestic (inflation-adjusted)  
and foreign short-term rates 
 





































US 90-day deposit rate
Chilean 90-day indexed deposit rate




13 uses the expected depreciation of the peso against the US dollar 
and sovereign risk premium as controls, specifically: 



















i c i  
where coefficient α measures the partial correlation between the domestic and foreign 
interest rates, and coefficients β1 and β2 capture the importance of the expected depreciation 
of the peso and the sovereign risk premium, respectively, in explaining the level of the 
domestic interest rate. The real exchange rate is employed in the estimation for inflation-
adjusted interest rates. 
First we compare the US three-month deposit rate with the domestic 90-day indexed deposit 
rate, using two-year moving windows. After July 2001, when the Central Bank of Chile 
started targeting nominal interest rates, we compare nominal rates over a six-month moving 
window, because we have a smaller number of observations. 
Graph 12  
Correlation between nominal domestic and  
foreign short-term rates 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
When indexed domestic rates are employed, the coefficient that captures the partial 
correlation between domestic and foreign short-term rates is not significant in any period 
(Graph 11). This can be interpreted as evidence of independence of monetary policy, an 
expected result. The same result applies when nominal short-term rates are used to test 
financial integration, after July 2001. However, during two brief periods, at the end of 2004 
and in mid-2006, the correlation between domestic and foreign short-term rates becomes 
significant, positive in the first episode and negative in the second (Graph 12). This may be 
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the result of similar shocks that affected short-term rates or their determinants both 
domestically and abroad. We have no clear explanation for the first episode, but the second 
(mid-2006) corresponds with the financial market turbulence of May–June 2006, which gave 
rise to a flight to quality and an increase in sovereign spreads. As a result, domestic and 
foreign short-term rates moved in opposite directions. Except for these two brief episodes, 
our results suggest that domestic and foreign short-term nominal rates are not correlated, 
which confirms our previous result in favour of monetary independence. 
The longer-term market will give us a better idea of financial integration, since it is less 
influenced by monetary policy. In Graph 13 we compare the rates on a five-year US TIP 
bond with those of a five-year bullet and eight-year coupon bond issued by the Central Bank 
of Chile (CBCh), which have similar durations. Next, in Graph 14 we compare five-year 
nominal bond rates. We used daily data for domestic and foreign interest rates, using six-
month moving windows to evaluate the evidence due to the small number of observations. 
When we employed inflation-adjusted rates, the estimated coefficient, in Graph 15, does not 
differ significantly from zero for most of the sample. This result is not surprising, as the rates 
on inflation-adjusted instruments seem to be affected mostly by idiosyncratic elements, such 
as the capital gains associated with changes in expected future inflation, and are held almost 
exclusively by domestic institutional investors. However, when nominal rates are employed, 
correlation is significant for most of the sample, and pass-through coefficients show an 
upward trend, an unequivocal sign of an increasing degree of financial integration 
(Graph 16). 
Graph 13 
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Graph 16  
Correlation between local and foreign  
nominal long-term rates 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Impact of changes in foreign investment limits of pension funds 
There is evidence that shifts in foreign investment limits of pension funds have a limited 
impact on asset prices. Using a monthly stock return model, Silva (2007) finds no evidence 
that pension fund stock transactions affect aggregate market returns in Chile. The author 
proposes that Chile’s growing integration with international financial markets reduces the 
effect of pension funds on local stock market prices. Additionally, there is evidence that 
changes in investment limits of pension funds have a limited effect on interest and exchange 
rates. On the one hand, Silva and Selaive (2008) find that a rise of 5% in the foreign 
investment limit causes an increase of only 1 basis point on inflation-adjusted interest rates. 
On the other hand, Cowan et al (2008) demonstrate that an increase of 10% in investment 
limits is associated with an accumulated depreciation of 2% of the Chilean peso against the 
US dollar. 
V.   Conclusions and challenges ahead  
The process of financial integration undergone by the Chilean economy in the past decade 
has not involved a significant increase in financial volatility, has allowed enhanced risk-
sharing for domestic investors, and has contributed to the development of the local 
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1  Corresponds to the total actual buy and sell transactions realised in the calendar 
year.  
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
Although this process of integration has been impressive, some challenges and 
developments remain for a further deepening of the financial links between Chile and the rest 
of the world. We tentatively explore some of these avenues below. 
First, cross-border flows of spot peso transactions are practically non-existent. This explains 
the significant role of the non-deliverable forward market as the derivatives market of choice 
for non-residents aiming to shift their exposure to the Chilean peso. This is probably linked to 
several aspects. Although participation by non-residents in local equity markets has been 
widespread after the waiver of capital gains tax in the case of transactions in liquid stocks, 
this has not been implemented in practice for fixed income transactions. Other related tax 
initiatives that could help in this direction are the administration of the withholding tax of 4% 
on interest income and enhanced clarity in the legal treatment of derivatives. Most of these 
aspects are currently under consideration by the Ministry of Finance. 
Second, although our payment and settlement infrastructure for securities has been sharply 
revamped thanks to the adoption of real-time gross settlement for central bank money, steps 
need to be undertaken to reduce settlement risk in foreign currency payments, as well as in 
local securities. Both the Ministry of Finance and the central bank are currently actively 
looking into these issues.  
Finally, the main challenge when aiming at further financial integration with the world is to 
closely monitor the financial stability implications of this integration. The tension between 
efficiency and security is probably the sharpest for an emerging economy in the area of 
external integration. Even financial systems where regulatory best practices and a generally 
sound macroeconomic framework are in place have been recently subject to sharp bouts of 
financial turbulence. Avoiding costly and disruptive financial crises, by timely policy actions 
and proper coordination, is probably the main challenge ahead for the Chilean economy, as 











1998  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006




Ahumada, L A, F Alarcón, J Selaive and J M Villena (2006a): “The Development of the 
Currency Derivatives Market in Chile”, in Central Bank of Chile, Financial Stability Report, 
First Half 2006. 
Ahumada, L A, C Echeverría, S Godoy and N Silva (2006b): “Characterization of Financial 
Account Asset and Liability Flows: Chile, 1993–2004”, in Central Bank of Chile, Financial 
Stability Report, First Half 2006. 
Bhagwati, J (1998): “The Capital Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and 
Dollars”, Foreign Affairs, vol 77, no 3, pp 7–12. 
Cardoso, E and I Goldfajn (1997): “Capital Flows to Brazil: The Endogeneity of Capital 
Controls”, IMF Working Paper WP/97/115, International Monetary Fund. 
Cashin, P and J McDermott (2002): “Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing and Capital 
Mobility: Evidence from Australia”, Australian Economic Papers, vol 41, no 1, pp 82–98. 
Cifuentes, R and J Desormeaux (2003): “Monetary policy and financial integration: the case 
of Chile”, in BIS Papers, no 23, “Globalisation and monetary policy in emerging markets”, 
May, pp 109–23. 
Cowan, K and J De Gregorio (2006): “International Borrowing, Capital Controls and the 
Exchange Rate: Lessons from Chile”, NBER Working Papers, no 11382, National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Cowan, K, J De Gregorio, A Micco and C Neilson (2007): “Financial Diversification, Sudden 
Stops and Sudden Starts”, Central Bank of Chile Working Papers, no 423.  
Cowan, K, A Micco and A Yáñez (2006): “Currency Mismatches in Chilean Manufacturing 
Firms”, in Central Bank of Chile, Financial Stability Report, First Half 2006. 
Cowan, K, D Rappoport and J Selaive (2008): “Tipo de cambio y límites de inversión en el 
extranjero de los fondos de pensiones”, in Banco Central de Chile, Informe de Estabilidad 
Financiera, Segundo Semestre 2007. 
De Gregorio, J, S Edwards and R Valdés (2000): “Controls on capital inflows: Do they 
work?”, NBER Working Papers, no 7645, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Edison, H, R Levine, L Ricci and T Sløk (2002): “International financial integration and 
economic growth”, Journal of International Money and Finance, vol  21, November,   
pp 749–76. 
Edwards, S (1998): “Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: Some Latin 
American Experiences”, NBER Working Papers, no 6800, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
———  (1999): “How Effective are Capital Controls?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
vol 13, no 4, pp 65–84. 
———  (2005): “Capital Controls, Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals”, NBER 
Working Papers, no 11170, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Eichengreen, B (2001): “Capital account liberalization: what do cross-country studies tell 
us?”, The World Bank Economic Review, vol 15, no 3, pp 344–65. 
Figueroa, L and A Jara (2006): “Currency Mismatch in the Chilean Banking System”, in 
Central Bank of Chile, Financial Stability Report, Second Half 2006. 
Forbes, K (2007): “One cost of the Chilean capital controls: increased financial constraints for 
smaller traded firms”, Journal of International Economics, vol 71, issue 2, pp 294–323. 142  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
Gallego, F, L Hernández and K Schmidt-Hebbel (1999): “Capital Controls in Chile: Effective? 
Efficient?”, Central Bank of Chile Working Papers, no 59, December. 
Glick, R, X Guo and M Hutchison (2006): “Currency Crises, Capital Account Liberalization, 
and Selection Bias”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 88, issue 4, November, 
pp 698–714. 
Klein, M W (2005): “Capital account liberalization, institutional quality and economic growth: 
theory and evidence”, NBER Working Papers, no 11112, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Krugman, P (1998): Bubble, boom, crash: theoretical notes on Asia’s crisis, manuscript. 
Labán, R and F Larraín (1997): “Can a Liberalization of Capital Outflows Increase Net 
Capital Inflows?”, Journal of International Money and Finance, vol 16, issue 3, pp 415–31. 
Larraín, F, R Labán and R Chumacero (1997): “What determines capital inflows?: an 
empirical analysis for Chile,” Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 97-09, April. 
Miniane, J (2004): “A New Set of Measures on Capital Account Restrictions”, IMF Staff 
Papers, vol 51, no 2, International Monetary Fund, August. 
Montiel, P and C Reinhart (1999): “Do capital controls and macroeconomic policies influence 
the volume and composition of capital flows? Evidence from the 1990s”, Journal of 
International Money and Finance, vol 18, issue 4, pp 619–35. 
Prasad, E and S J Wei (2005): “The Chinese Approach to Capital Inflows: Patterns and 
Possible Explanations”, NBER Working Papers, no 11306, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Rodrik, D (1998): “Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?”, in Essays in International 
Finance, no 207, “Should the IMF pursue capital-account convertibility?”, International 
Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, May. 
Shah, A and I Patnaik (2005): “India’s Experience with Capital Flows: The Elusive Quest for 
a Sustainable Current Account Deficit”, NBER Working Papers, no 11387, National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Silva, C G (2007): “Impact of pension fund transactions on the local stock market”, in Central 
Bank of Chile, Financial Stability Report, First Half 2007. 
Silva, C G and J Selaive (2008): “Fondos de pensiones y tasas de interés de instrumentos 
del Banco Central de Chile”, in Banco Central de Chile, Informe de Estabilidad Financiera, 
Segundo Semestre 2007. 
Sheffrin, S and Woo, W T (1990) "Present value tests of an intertemporal model of the 
current account." Journal of International Economics, 29(3-4), pp 237-53. 
Stiglitz, J (2000): “Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability”, World 
Development, vol 28, no 6, pp 1075–86. 
Valdés-Prieto, S and M Soto (1996): “¿Es el Control Selectivo de Capitales Efectivo en 
Chile? Su efecto Sobre el Tipo de Cambio Real”, Cuadernos de Economía, vol 33, no 98, 
pp 77–108. 